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The "Private Army" of the Tax Farn1s · 
The Men and their Origins 
by Earl ROBISHEAUX * 
There is no specialized study of the men who composed the "private 
army" of the Royal General Tax Farms in 18th century France. We have 
a good work on the tax farmers themselves, 1 but only modest information 
about those who did their dirty work for them. Pierre Roux has an outline 
of their duties; 2 Matthews gives us an idea of their numbers and organiza-
tion; 3 Lavoisier 4 and Necker 5 describe their deployment. Adrien Delahante's 
classic work insists that the guards of the Farms were "types of Bohemians 
scorned and abhorred," and mistakenly believed that they were recruited 
throughout the kingdom. 6 Who, in fact, were the men in the private army 
of the Tax Farms ? What were the differences between the officers and the 
men ? How did this army function, and how was it organized? 
Basically, the "private army" was a paramilitary formation with 23,000 
men in 1784, and was divided on paper into 352 divisions scattered throughout 
the kingdom. 7 The basic operational unit was the brigade composed of from 
four to twenty men which functioned as an organized unit "to protect the 
rights of the Farms." 8 There were two types of brigades. Sedentary brigades, 
by far the most numerous, were stationed at fixed geographical points and 
seldom went further than a half a day's march from their stations. They 
were commanded by two officers: a brigadier and a sub-brigadier. Occasion-
ally four officers were attached to the larger units. About a third of the 
brigades were ambulatory; its men mounted on horseback. Each was led by 
a captain and a lieutenant with four or more men under their command. 
All of the brigades were named after small hamlets and villages of the region 
of lower Normandy where they were stationed, such as "Isigny," "Neuilly," 
"Breville," "Deauville," and "Arromanches." 
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The main purpose of the brigades was to supervise the salt trade for 
the General Farms. The principal duty of the men derived largely from the 
local regulations concerning its sale and distribution. For administrative 
reasons, the Farms divided Lower Normandy into two regions, the pays du 
quart bouillon, the larger, and the pays de grandes gabelles. The pays du 
quart bouillon comprised most of the generalites of Caen and Alem;on, 990 
parishes in all. Its distinguishing characteristic was that inhabitants of the 
region were not subject to the gabelle, but had the right to procure salt from 
local salt marches. The Crown claimed a fourth of their procurement (though 
it was closer to a fifth in actual practice), whence the name "quart bouillon." 
In this area the local population could obtain salt for less than 1/20 of the 
going price in the pays de grandes gabelles. This latter was the other admin-
istrative subdivision of Lower Normandy, and most of the territory around 
the cities of Caen and Bayeux fell into its jurisdiction. In this region indi-
viduals paid the gabelle - that is, purchased fixed quantities of salt at high 
prices. Common to each of these regions was the sexte roll, which was a 
parish register listing the amount of salt that parishioners were required to 
purchase (in the pays de grandes gabelles) or were allowed to procure (in the 
quart bouillon). 
The chief responsibility of the employees in the brigades was the verifi-
cation of the sexte register. In the pays du quart bouillon they inspected 
households to insure that the families of the parish took no more than their 
per-capita allotment of salt. When such was the case, it was a virtually 
certain indication that the additional quantities were smuggled into the pays 
de grandes gabelles to be sold on the black market. Verifications in the 
pays de grandes gabelles were carried out to insure that all members of the 
families were listed on the roll and had taken their salt required by the 
gabelle. Whether in the pays du quart bouillon or in the pays de grandes 
gabelles, examinations were carried out in the cities by the sedentary brigades 
and in the countryside by the mounted. 
In addition to their duties with the sexte, the brigades of the Farms also 
performed numerous other functions. They patrolled river crossings and 
road junctions to prevent the movement of contraband salt and tobacco. 
They watched over the collectors of the gabelle to insure that they delivered 
no more than the purchased quantities of salt, and that they deposited the 
collections in the treasury of the local grenier ii sel rather than their own 
pockets. The sedentary brigades supervised retail distributors of salt 
(regrattiers) to discourage them from purchasing on the black market. Before 
1778, when the Farms still collected the aides, they watched over the move-
ment of cidre, eaux-de-vie, and other drinks. After the Crown assumed 
direct administration of these duties in 1778, the employees were left mostly 
to the gabelle and tobacco trade. 9 
9 They performed other minor functions involving the customs. "Instructions 
preliminaires sur toutes Jes parties des Fermes," AN K 887, no. 7, fos . 28-41 (ms. 
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Their most difficult task was to combat organized groups out to defraud 
the Farms. The brigades of the General Tax Farms were organized in the 
1680's following the formation of the Company of General Tax Farmers 
itself. 10 Their paramilitary formation arose from the fact that in the years 
immediately following their creation, they were often called on to do battle 
with large bands of outlaws roaming the countryside. Their military organi-
zation gave them an advantage of command and control which often proved 
decisive in their encounters with such gangs. 
During the wars of the reign of Louis XIV, the "private army" of the 
Tax Farms engaged in one of the most extraordinary campaigns in their 
history. Louis called to the colours an army of immense size, and in the 
winter when the weather was unfavourable for military operations, the army 
billeted its troops in the provinces. In Lower Normandy large numbers of 
men were put into winter quarter in Caen, Bayeux, St. LO, Mortain, and 
the small villages and hamlets dotting the region. Invariably these troops 
began to take advantage of the substantial difference in the price of salt 
between the pays de grandes gabelles and the regions not subject to the 
gabelle. They began to purchase cheap salt in Brittany and in the Cotentin 
peninsula and to smuggle it into the high-price regions of the pays de grandes 
gabelles. The same quantity of salt purchased in Brittany could usually be 
sold in the suburbs of Caen or Bayeux for twenty or more times its purchase 
price. The wars of the reign of Louis XIV brought into being a large force 
of organized units well placed to make considerable profits from such illicit 
trade. 
They were helped and encouraged by the bad climate and the poor 
harvests of the period, which made the local population more willing to 
defraud the Farms. In the region around Bayeux, for example, the wheat 
harvest, the principle source of nourishment and income, was fair to bad in 
1684-1685, 1692-1694, 1697-1701, 1704, 1709-1710, and 1712-1714. 11 
The years with good harvests were 1686-1691, 1695-1696, 1702-1703, 1705-
1708, 1711, and 1715. Nearly half of the harvests were bad enough to 
provoke sharp rises in the price of bread. This meant that more money had 
to be paid for basic foodstuffs and that less was available for other pur-
chases and for paying taxes. In such rigorous conditions, large numbers of 
individuals, who otherwise would not have purchased or trafficked in smug-
gled salt, began to do so on a large scale. During his tour of the region in 
1707, a year with a good harvest, the intendant Nicolas Foucault noted that 
undated); also, DE LA MOTTE, Le Guide des employes ou instructions pour apprendre 
a verbaliser (Amiens, 1751), p. 57 , found in AN G1 63 dos. 14. 
10 Pierre VIEUVILLE, Nouveau traite des elections (Paris, 1739), p. 568 (BN: 
Lf38/3) traces their origins to similar creations by Charles VII in 1452, Fram;ois I in 
1534, and Henri III, 1581 -1583. The Ordinance of the Gabelles of 1680 provided for 
such a force. 
11 Mohamed EL KoRDI, Bayeux aux XV/l' et XV/l/' siec/es (Paris, 1970), 
pp. 284-286; 192-93. 
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only profits from salt smuggling made it possible for many peasants to pay 
their taxes and purchase bread. 12 
A necessary source of income even in good years, in the bad the profits 
from salt running became vital. With the coming of the war, regiments of 
the royal army in winter quarter were then on the spot to organize much of 
the provisioning of the black market. The poor harvests of the period com-
bined with the unprecedented size of the French army set the stage for one 
of the wildest smuggling operations in the history of the General Tax Farms. 
In Lower Normandy the problem was especially acute, but it occurred 
throughout the kingdom, notably along the borders of Britanny, the quart 
bouillon, and along the salt marshes of the south and the Midi. Troops in 
winter quarter moved out for the regions of cheap salt, often bringing in 
hundreds of horseloads at a time. 
When the brigades of the Tax Farms moved into the field to put a stop 
to the trade, small-scale warfare erupted: in many cases troops abruptly 
ceased to operate as groups of free-lance soldiers and began to function as 
military units. Le Riche, Director of the Farms at Caen, wrote that "the 
troops who are in this Generalite and that of Alern;:on are going to make a 
frightful disorder and the employees will not know how to remedy it .... " 13 
And he was right. By December, 1692, the Company of General Tax Farm-
ers complained to the king that troops "were assembling in such great num-
bers that it is impossible for the employees and guards of the Farms to stop 
them." 14 Le Riche complained that, when the troops head out for the 
frontier with Brittany, "there are officers in front ... and they are marching 
in battle order." 15 
After 1695 the brigades of the Farms fought a series of desperate act-
ions throughout the countryside with elements of the royal army. In March 
of that year several brigades fought an action with 20-25 dragoons outside 
the village of Allemande, winning the day because of their superior position. 
The battle was fought with pistols, muskets, and even bayonets. 16 All 
through the late 1690's and early 1700's the situation grew still worse as 
the brigades clashed with military units running contraband. By 1707 army 
units were marauding the country with virtual impunity; many took to the 
offensive, systematically searching out and defeating the brigades in open 
battle wherever they could catch them. Le Riche wrote: 17 
Salt smuggling continues with ferocious force, dragoons from Falaise 
and Argentan are grouping together in bands of 50, 60, and 80, armed to the 
teeth, our guards are not strong enough to attack them because we can only 
make detachments of 15 or 20 men . . . . M. de Marzin [Director of the 
12 AN G7 217. 
13 Ibid. 
14 AN G71216 letter of 24 December. 
15 AN G7217 letter of 19 March . 
16 AN G7214 letter of 25 March from De Marzin. 
17 AN 07217 letter of 17 March. 
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Aides at Caen] is now at the head of a large detachment along the frontier 
with Brittany, and he tells me that there are two numerous bands operating 
there . . . . The peasants see that the dragoons can force their way in large 
numbers, and now are beginning to group themselves together. They are 
scarcely any worse. In a word, the disorder is great. 
The situation was so bad in July 1707 that Foucault ordered the Terri-
torial Police (Marechaussee) to press men into the brigades from wherever 
they could be found. 18 In November the brigades fought an action with 
40-50 cavalry near Villedieu. 19 In the winter of 1709 the infantry regiment 
Razilly encamped near Bayeux was running a massive trade in salt. 20 Large 
numbers of troops were in action in 1709, the year of the "hiver terrible," 
most notably around Caen, Falaise, and Alern;on. 21 In January, 1710 De 
Marzin managed to gather a number of brigades from Caen and Laval. He 
took them to the field in search of the cavalry regiment St. Aignoy, then 
running contraband salt from Brittany. On the 15th of January they caught 
it, and fought a hand-to-hand engagement with 150 troops in open terrain. 
They captured 49 cavalrymen and 124 horseloads of salt. 22 Several officers 
of the brigades were killed in the battle. Later in the month De Marzin's 
group tangled with 180 cavalry near Martain. 23 Near Laval in June, 1710, 
the brigades fought a big battle with 200-250 mounted cavalry. 24 Around 
Falaise in February, 1711, 100-120 troops tried to force their way into the 
pays de grandes gabelles with fifty horseloads of salt. All were armed. They 
smashed through the defensive ring of brigades separating Brittany from the 
rest of France, heading into the regions of high-priced salt. A handful of 
brigades of the Farms together with a large crowd of bounty hunters, some 
of whom were themselves soldiers, finally arrested their progress after a 
desperate engagement. 25 
The pressure on the employees of the Farms was so great, for this 
amounted to small-scale warfare, that many began to fail. Foucault com-
plained in September, 1707, that troops not only picked battles with guards 
of the Farms, but even set fire to houses refusing their demands. 26 Gangs 
of smugglers raided jails to free their comrades and openly boasted about 
their bloody encounters with the brigades. 27 The guards around Dieppe 
complained bitterly in 1710 that the region was filled with roving bands of 
troops smuggling salt and openly seeking to do battle with them. 28 Employees 
around Tours and Poitiers began to balk at the prospect of battling prores-
18 AN 07217 letter of 23 July. 
19 AN 07217 letter of 24 November. 
20 AN 071235. 
21 AN 071235. 
22 AN 071225. 
23 AN 07218 letter of 17 January from La Briffe (intendant). 
24 AN 071225. 
25 AN 071240. 
26 AN 07217 letter of 10 September. 
21 AN 07217 letter of 22 March 1709 from Foucault de Magny (son of Nicolas 
Foucault, intendant). 
28 AN 071238. 
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sional soldiers. 20 The guards of the brigades were usually outnumbered and 
had inferior training; small wonder they hesitated in the face of such odds. 
As the war began to draw to a conclusion and as economic conditions 
in the countryside improved, these confrontations slowly came to an end. 
Never again did the brigades have to take on units of the royal army in 
open battle on such a scale. There were three contributing causes which 
brought about an end to these actions: first, in the last years of the reign of 
Louis XIV, most of the French army was demobilized. There remained 
fewer troops and units to engage in large-scale operations against the brigades 
in the Tax Farms. Secondly, from 1709/ 10 the army made a greater effort 
to stop the excesses of its men. In that year the army sent De Beauveau, 
Inspector General of Cavalry, into Lower Normandy to discipline the troops. 
Le Riche, Director of the Farms at Caen, wrote that "he has worked so well 
that everything is calm for the present." 30 Violent battles still erupted after 
his mission, but 1710 represents something of a turning point. His most 
successful method was to pay bounties to troops so they would help to 
capture rather than participate with other salt smugglers. 1710 was some-
thing of a turning point in the cycle of famine as well. In Lower Normandy 
the harvests of 1710-1712, and 1714 were fair to good, with 1713 the only 
bad year. 31 Better harvests took some of the burden off the peasants and 
artisans, who were then less inclined to purchasing smuggled salt, and even 
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less disposed to trafficking themselves. This third factor, the improvement 
of the harvests, was probably the most decisive of all. At any rate, by 1715 
large engagements between the royal army and the brigades of the Tax Farms 
had come to an end. 
It would be interesting to discover what sort of fellow was attracted to 
these units of the Tax Farms. To combat regular military units, or to attempt, 
to root out fraud by house to house inspections, were tasks requiring 
a particular form of courage. Unfortunately, no significant sources from the 
earlier years have survived, if indeed the Farms even kept such records. We 
do know that contemporaries thought little of the men's abilities; that Fou-
cault once complained, "the greater part of those employed there have never 
served before, and have no courage to face up to salt smugglers." 32 He 
thought their ranks contained too few ex-soldiers and that a greater effort 
should be made to recrnit more of them. Beyond this one can say little, for 
the lack of statistical sources. However, we can answer a number of ques-
tions concerning the men in the brigades in the late 18th century. 
This study is based on 429 officers and men comprising four capitaine-
ries generates (a type of administrative subdivision) deployed in Lower 
Normandy on 1 January 1789. 33 I have selected two capitaineries generates 
from the vicinity of Caen (Sallenelles and Caen), one from the region around 
Cherbourg, and Grandville. On several charts I have broken the statistics 
down according to capitaineries Renerales to show how negligible were the 
differences among the men throughout the region. The resulting homogeneity 
suggests that a broader statistical base would not substantially alter the con-
clusions presented here. I have restricted this work to Lower Normandy, 
however, and the employees in other regions might well have been different 
from the Normans. 
A brief glance at the wages paid to the brigades reveals much about 
the men in their service. Captains and lieutenants, who commanded the 
itinerant brigades, annually received 500 and 400-440 livres respectively. 
Officers in the non-mobile brigades, brigadiers and sub-brigadiers, were 
given 450 and 390 livres. Ordinary guards in the ranks earned from 330-
400 livres a year, with the higher wages going to the men in the itinerant 
units. The men were paid at the local grenier a sel, the local salt magazine. 34 
32 AN G7.1222 memoir of 1703. 
83 What follows draws on a collection of cahiers at the Archives Nationales 
in Paris, AN Gl 72. They are "Etats de signalement des employes," and are somewhat 
misleadingly inventoried, "Memoires sur la defense des cotes de Normandie." Though 
the carton contains a number of memoirs on the suppression of tax fraud along the 
Norman co-asts, it also has forty-eight cahiers which describe the individuals in the 
paramilitary organization of the General Tax Farms. Farm officials in Lower Normandy 
compiled these lists from 1770-1789; the hats treat only employees deployed in the 
Direction de Caen. Similar sources exist for other regions. 
34 AN 0172 dos. 4, memoir on the organization of the Farms in Normandy. 
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These were modest wages for the tasks, and the men attracted to them came 
from modest backgrounds. 
Table I indicates the previous occupations of the men employed in the 
brigades in 1789. Nearly half, 46.8%, were former peasants and soldiers; 
and the lion's share of these were peasants. The term employed for them is 
laboureurs, which often means a man with more than a few parcels of land, 
a draught animal, and other modest possessions - the higher echelon of the 
peasantry, in other words. The "dirty work" of the Farms was thus done 
largely by organized groups of peasants and soldiers. Tradesmen from the 
cities counted for a very small portion of the total (9.8% ); nor is their 
representation susbtantially higher in the brigades stationed in or near large 
cities. In the capitainerie of Caen, which contained seven brigades totalling 
56 men, tradesmen comprised a mere 8.0%. The capitainerie of Cherbourg 
had 18 brigades totalling 116 men, but only 5.1 % (6 men) listed trades as 
their former profession. 
There are three general distinctions which separate the men in the 
ranks from their officers. The most pronounced and the most important is 
literacy. Literacy in this case means the ability to write well enough to com-
pose a legal dossier (proces verbal) against an individual suspected of de-
frauding the Tax Farms. The whole system of enforcement of the regulations 
against smuggling depended on the ability of the employees to deposit formal 
legal complaints with the local judicial bodies (elections and greniers a sel) 
having competence in the matter. Employees who could not do so were 
severely limited in their usefulness to the Farms. De la Motte wrote, "we 
do not doubt the activity of some zealous employees, but it happens all too 
often that those who have this desirable quality are not capable of manifest-
ing it by completing a regular proces verbal." 35 With respect to the men in 
the ranks. De la Motte was right: only 4.0% of them could write reports 
(Table m. But among the officers, 64.8% exhibited enough 
literacy to place themselves in the higher levels of the brigades. The striking 
thing is the vast gap between the capabilities of the officers and the men. 
For every man who is literate, there are sixteen such literate officers. Even 
combining the second level (the ability to write) with the highest, the gulf 
between them remains wide - 84.3% of the officers were in the two top 
categories, while only 28.6% of the men. The officers dominate the top 
literacy levels, the men the lower. 61.4% of the men, almost two-thirds. 
were capable of no more than writing just a little or signing their own 
names. 
The source of the general superiority of the officers in literacy seems 
to lie with their former professions. Table I shows that, in the officer 
corps, no group of former occupation dominates the whole. Numerically. 
the distribution of former laboureurs, sons of former employees, and soldiers. 
35 DE LA MOTI"B, p. 1. 
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is relatively equal. Among the 124 officers for whom information is given, 
21.7 % were former peasants, 20.l % the sons of former employees, and 
25.0% former soldiers. But percentage of numbers is misleading, for in the 
brigades there are half again as many soldiers as former employees, and 
more laboureurs than either. So another comparison must be used. Table III 
expresses the ratio between the number of men whose former profession is 
known, compared to that occupation's representation in the officer corps. 
Thus of 61 sons of former employees in the brigade as a whole, 25 (40.9 % ) 
were officers; 38.8 % of all the soldiers in the brigades were officers, but 
only 20.9% of the laboureurs. Thus while these three occupational groups 
are relatively equal in numbers in the officer corps, they are not equal with 
respect to the officer-guard ratio within their own group. A man who was 
the son of a former employee or an ex-soldier had twice the chance to 
become an officer as the one who was once a peasant. Further still, Table IV 
shows the literacy patterns within the former occupation groups irrespective 
of rank. Again, those with the clear advantage are the sons of former em-
ployees; 76.8% of them are in the top two literacy categories, compared to 
43 .8 % of the soldiers, and 31. 7 % of the peasants. The conclusion is that 
the former occupation made a difference: a son of a former employee or a 
soldier had a greater opportunity to become an officer than one who was 
not. 
The ability to write reports counted for a lot, but was not everything. 
The soldiers were the most heavily represented occupational group in the 
officer corps, this despite the fact that they as a group fall in the lower 
literacy levels (Table IV). Their proportion is explained largely by their 
previous military training. Former military men had experience with the 
royal army, a background which the Farms thought worthy of a command 
position. One has only to recall Foucault's complaint that there were too 
few soldiers in the brigades, and the need to recruit more of them. The 
Farms systematically favoured soldiers who were industrious, such that of 
the 5 officers in the brigades in Lower Normandy who could do little other 
than sign their own name, 4 were ex-soldiers. Perhaps these were the dili-
gent types alluded to by De la Motte. If a military man were literate, or 
at least able to write, then his chances of becoming an officer were virtually 
certain: he possessed both skills which would enable his brigade to execute 
its duties most effectively. 
The cahiers do not provide sufficient data to measure professional 
mobility of the officers over an extended period of time, though they do 
indicate the past position each man occupied before assuming his present 
post. Table V shows that, of the 128 officers for whom information is 
given, 34 (26.5%) were but simple guards in the ranks before becoming 
officers. Of the remaining 94, 25 (19.9%) had risen in rank with their last 
change in position, 61 (47.5%) retained the same rank as before, while 4 
(3 .0% ) fell a notch . In all, 59 officers (46.4 % ) rose in rank with their last 
change in position. 
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The second major distinction between the officers and the men in the 
ranks was the length of time each tended to serve in the General Tax Farms. 
The data in Table VI shows that the average officer had been employed in 
the Farms for 16.09 years, while the average guard could muster only 
5.82 years - a ratio between the two of nearly 3: 1. The disparity is less 
marked with respect to the length of time each had served with their present 
brigades. The men had been with their present unit on the average of 
2.59 years, while the officers averaged only 4.32 years. This suggests that 
the officers entered the Farms at an earlier age and stayed longer. However, 
this is not the case; there are no substantial differences between the average 
ages of entry. Average age of entry for officers was 25 years and 26.5 for 
the men. More than likely the officers, because they were promoted 
and enjoyed some command responsibility - to say nothing of better pay -
tended to remain in the Farms much longer than the men under their 
command. 
Though the difference between the men and their officers is great, 
even the comparatively short stay of the men (6 years) is long enough 
to show that the brigades were not filled with floating misfits. Their length 
of service hints that their superiors might have been pleased with their 
subordinates. This can be measured statistically, however crudely~ Each 
year the higher officials in the Farms rated the performances of their em-
ployees; these evaluations fall into several pro-forma types: tres bon, bon, 
or some unsatisfactory remark. There is, of course, no way to determine 
whether these estimations represent the true inclinations of the superiors, 
or their effort to justify their own recruiting. For what they are worth, the 
ratings show (Table VII) that they were satisfied with their men. 29.8% 
of the employees were considered of superior quality, a number of them 
receiving the comments of actif or zele. Of the rest, 47.2% were good 
enough to rate a bon, while 14.9% of the 429 men surveyed were considered 
lacking in some manner. Such comments as "stupid," or "dissipated," or 
"sans aveux" are usually cited. For 8.1 % of the men, no comment was 
reported, they having just entered the Farms and lacked the service to 
provide a basis of judgement. 
The third and last major distinction separating the men from their 
officers is age - the officers were considerably older. Table VIII shows that 
the men in the ranks were on the average 31.6 years old, their officers 39.2. 
This difference, we have seen, stems not from the fact that the officers 
entered the Farms at an earlier age, for they did not, but because they 
prolonged their service, most likely because of promotion, responsibility, 
and pay. 
A number of factors lead us to believe that some practices of the men 
in the brigades differed scarcely from the society around them. Marriage 
is one. The average age of the men in the ranks (31.6 years) is close to the 
average age of marriage of the parishioners in the region around Bayeux, which 
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El Kordi had determined to be about 27 years. 36 Unless the men in the 
brigades stood out from the native population, as Delahante suggests, 37 we 
would expect about half of them to be married, since the difference between 
the ages is only about 4 years. The comparison reveals that 52.8% of the 
men in the brigades were married - almost identical to what El Kordi 
found. The officers were considerably older (39.6 years) and, hence, 73.4% 
were married (Table X). The proportion of widowed men and officers. is 
slight, 3.7% and 6.3% respectively. Including these figures with the mar-
ried men, we see that 58.9% of all employees were married, 4.4% widowed, 
and 36.7% unmarried. Thus the men in the brigades were mostly family 
men, not wandering individuals with few attachments. 
The greater part of them and their wives came from the local popula-
tion. 90.9% (Table IX) of the men were born fewer than 25 leagues 
(100 km) from their present place of work; fewer than 10% came from 
the more distant regions. Among those who did, one came from Nancy 
(150 leagues), Roulette en Corse (250), Ancosse (200), and Vernantois en 
Comte. An even greater portion of their wives came from Lower Normandy. 
Of the 232 wives for whom information is given, 226 (97 .3 % ) were born 
within 25 leagues of their current place of residence, while a scant 3 % came 
from the more distant parts of the kingdom. But though the men in the 
brigades tended to marry local, Norman women, surprisingly few married 
individuals from their native village. For 253 marriages where the place of 
birth is recorded for both husband and wife, only 50 (19. 7 % ) came from 
the same village or hamlet. That the men were Normans is significant: that 
they married Norman women, more so. It proves that the employees of the 
Farms had strong local roots, and were not at all "outsiders" enforcing the 
regulations of distant superiors. When in the summer and fall of 1789 the 
lower classes struck out against the employees of the Farms, they attacked 
above all the men in the brigades, who were their neighbours. What set them 
apart was not their former occupation, or their geographical origins, but 
what they did, which defined, after all, who they were. 
Mostly former peasants and ex-soldiers, half of whom could not write 
at all or very little: These were the men who went into the brigades of the 
General Tax Farms. They were not only married, for the most part, but 
were well on the way to raising families as well. 77.2% of the 272 married 
men had at least one child, while only 22.8% had none. In all, the 210 
men with children had 458 sons and daughters for an average of 2.18 
children per family. In this sense too, the employees differed little from the 
local population from which they were recruited and where they retained 
strong ties. 
The men in the brigades were swept into reorganization by the torrent 
of 1789. The French Revolution in Lower Normandy began in the spring 
36 EL KOROi, pp. 122-123. 
37 DELAHANTE, J, p. 208. 
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and summer of 1787 with the calling of the Provincial Assembly of Lower 
Normandy; in an instant the new body plunged into an intense struggle 
with the administrative apparatus of the intendancy and the tax courts, the 
elections and the Cour des Comptes de Normandie at Rouen. The battle 
raged for control of the system of direct taxes; it was so keen that they 
collectively destroyed the system in the fall and winter of 1788, generating 
in the process wild excitement which spilled over into the summer of 1789. 
In the summer of that year popular uprisings made the first generalized 
attacks against the brigades of the tax Farms. At Lisieux an administrator 
wrote, "the general insurrection in the entire kingdom manifested itself in 
this city last July 10 ... the employees for the collection of the aides, carried 
away with terror, abandoned their offices and ceased all functions." 38 In 
September the residents of the bourg of Harcourt demanded to pay their 
duties directly to the Comite des Finances of the National Assembly, and 
not to the commissaries of the Farms. 39 In November at Bernay, municipal 
officers complained that the employees consistently over-priced tarifs . 40 
An ancien garde du corps du Roi in the municipality of Sap, in Lower 
Normandy, wrote, "salt is selling today in the market place like wheat ... 
the aides are entirely abolished . . . all the registers are burned . . . the same 
with tobacco, nobody is paying the old taxes any more, and it is impossible 
to reestablish the Farms without a horrible effusion of blood." 41 
The popular uprisings contributed to the reorganization of the employees 
in 1791. The law of 5 November 1790 suspended the internal customs 
duties and created a national customs union. The decree of 25 April 1791 
restructured the employees of the Farms: the guards and their officers were 
nationalized, formed into 163 capitaineries generates comprising 13,284 
men. 42 By decrees of 20 March and 31 July 1791 the men in the brigades 
discharged with more than ten years' service claimed a pension of 50 livres 
a month until reemployed. The law of 20 March required new appointments 
in the financial administration to come from former employees of the sup-
pressed services. Thus the National Assembly incorporated the men of the 
"private army" of the Tax Farms into a national army within the bureaucracy. 
as AN 0••24 no. 314. The problem of the guards of the Farms submerged in 
a sea of popular hostility is treated in F. HINCKER, Les franfais devant l'impot sous 
l'ancien regime (Paris, 1971). 
39 AN 0·•24 no. 315. 
40 Ibid., no. 3'14. 
41 Ibid., no. 315. 
42 J. F. BoSHER, The Single Duty Proiect (London , 1964), pp. 157-158. 
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Table I: FORMER OCCUPATIONS 
Occupations 
Peasants 
Soldiers 
Sons of former employees 
"Chez quelqu'un" 
Trades 
Sailors 
Studying 
Miscellaneous 
Totals 
Category 
Write and verbalize 
Write 
Write inadequately 
Sign only 
Not specified 
Totals 
Table III: 
Fonner Occupations 
Sons of employees 
Soldiers 
Peasants 
Men 
Number % 
129 30.0 
80 1.6 
61 14.2 
47 11.0 
42 9.8 
31 7.2 
39 9.2 
429 100.0 
Table II: LITERACY 
Men 
Number % 
12 4.0 
86 28.6 
85 28.2 
117 38.8 
1 0.4 
301 100.0 
FORMER OCCUPATIONS COMPARED 
% officers 
40.9 
38.8 
20.9 
Table IV : LITERACY 
write in-
Fonner Occupations % write & write adequately 
verbalize % % 
Sons of employees 29.5 49.1 13. l 
Soldiers 25.0 18.8 25.0 
Sailors 0.0 9.7 16.1 
Peasants 11.6 20.1 27.4 
All employees 22.1 25 .8 23.2 
Table V: OFFICERS' CHANGE IN STATUS 
Capitainerie gen. Rose from Rose Fell Un-
Ranks changed 
Caen 5 2 0 5 
Grandville 6 8 2 13 
Cherbourg 12 7 0 16 
Sallenelles 11 8 2 27 
Combined 34 25 4 61 
% 26.5 19.9 3.0 47.5 
Officers 
Number % 
27 21.7 
31 25.0 
25 20.1 
15 11.7 
5 4.0 
21 17.5 
124 100.0 
Officers 
Number % 
83 64.8 
25 19.5 
14 10.9 
5 3.9 
I 0.9 
128 100.0 
% men 
59.1 
61.2 
79. I 
sign 
% 
8.3 
31.2 
74.2 
40.9 
28.4 
Un· Totals 
specified 
I 13 
2 31 
I 36 
0 48 
4 128 
3.0 100.0 
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Table VI : LENGTH OF SERVICE (IN YEARS) 
Capitainerie generale 
Caen 
Grandville 
Cherbourg 
Sallenelles 
Average 
Capitainerie 
Caen 
G randville 
Cherbourg 
Sa Ilene Iles 
Totals 
Capitainerie 
Caen 
G randville 
Cherbourg 
Sallenelles 
Average 
gen. 
gen. 
Men 
7.24 yrs. 
6.48 
5.72 
4.76 
5.86 
Table VII : SERVICE 
Unfavorable "hon" 
3 22 
21 69 
26 47 
14 65 
64 203 
14.9 % 47.2 % 
Officers 
19.11 yrs. 
14.98 
16.88 
15.41 
16.09 
EVALUATION OF 
"tres boo" 
21 
22 
34 
51 
128 
29.8% 
Table VIII : AGE AVERAGE 
Officers Average 
13 40.0 
31 37.6 
36 38.2 
48 41.2 
39.2 
MEN 
Not spec. 
IO 
5 
9 
10 
34 
8.1% 
Men 
43 
86 
80 
92 
Ratio 
2.6-1 
2.3-1 
2.9-1 
3.2-1 
2.7-1 
Totals 
56 
117 
116 
140 
429 
100% 
Average 
33 .3 
31.6 
30.6 
31.6 
31.6 
Table IX: DISTANCES BETWEEN PARISH OF ORIGIN AN D PLACE OF DEPLOYMENT 
Distance Men % Officers % Wives % 
Fewer than 272 90.7 102 79.7 246 97 .3 
25 leagues 
26-50 JI 3.7 14 10.9 3 1.2 
leagues 
51 + 16 5.4 8 6.3 3 1.2 
leagues 
Not 2 0.2 4 3. 1 0.3 
specified 
TOTALS 301 100.0 128 100.0 253 100.0 
Table X: MARITAL STATUS 
Status Men % Officers % Combined % 
Married 159 52.8 94 73.4 253 58.9 
Single 131 43 .5 26 20.3 157 36.7 
Widowed 11 3.7 8 6.3 19 4.4 
TOTALS 301 100.0 128 100.0 429 100.0 
